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BANK STATEMENTS, CANCELLED CHECKS, AND
ARTICLE FOUR 1N THE ELECTRONIC AGE
Norman Penney*
task was to prepare a short article dealing in some depth
with specific problems which have arisen under Article Four
of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code). Unfortunately for purposes of criticism, but happily for those affected by Article Four, a
canvass of recent reported cases as well as bank operations people and
bank counsel has revealed very few problems of any significance to
either the general practitioner or even the so-called commercial law
specialist.1 This prompts two comments: (1) Article Four seems to be
working so smoothly that to develop a "problem" would be to make
a mountain out of a molehill (all too frequently done in law review
articles); and (2) a greater service could perhaps be performed by
considering briefly a more general problem-namely, the effect, if
any, of the accelerating operational and technological changes in the
banking industry on Article Four. In order to examine the impact of
present and contemplated operational innovations and, to some extent, measure the workability of the Code provisions, one aspect
of the bank-customer relationship-the periodic issuance of checking account statements accompanied by paid items-has been selected as the focal point of discussion.

M

Y

I.

THE METHODS OF PREPARING BANK STATEMENTS
AND RETURNED ITEMS

It is customary for banks to issue statements of account to their
checking account customers at periodic intervals, monthly or quarterly, or on special request. 2 It is also customary to accompany the
statement with those cancelled checks which are reflected on the
statement. The purpose of this service is to afford the customer a
record of the debits and credits posted to his account and to enable
• Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1950, Yale University; LL.B. 1953,
Cornell University.-Ed.
1. Problems suggested and considered included: (1) a critique of the California
variations to §§ 4-213(1) and 4-303 of the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited
as U.C.C.]; (2) what sort of formality should be required (in the way of written or
other notice) in lieu of returning the item itself, if it were being held for protest in
support of the payor bank's right of return and recoupment under § 4-301(1); and
finally, (3) the banks' alleged difficulties in coping with oral stop payment orders under
§ 4-403.

2. See .At.lloM, PURDY, SCHNEIDER & WmITINGHAM, AUTOMATION IN BANKING 24-25
(1963); BEUTEL, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW 21 (1965);
5 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING 353 (1936).
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him to compare the balance reflected on the bank's statement with
the balance arrived at in his own records. The customer may also
verify that the checks were paid in accordance with his instructions
and that the bank has paid only those checks which he had, in fact,
drawn. Due to the introduction during the past decade of new banking equipment and procedures, the manner of the preparation and
forwarding of these bank statements has changed markedly. Moreover, within the industry, there is anticipation of even more drastic
operational changes which will affect these practices.
In the past, and even today in smaller banks, the statement
period was determined by the amount of time necessary t-o complete
a single sheet of the particular customer's statement form. This practice permitted cycling of the statement-rendering procedure in a
manner which avoided placing an undue burden on the bank's
staff and was relatively inexpensive.3 The difficulty with such a
practice, however, was that the customer received his statement at
somewhat irregular intervals; if the amount of account usage was
small, several months or even years might pass between statements.
This shortcoming, coupled with the general increase in the use of
checking accounts, 4 has led most banks to use a thirty-day cycle which
coincides with either the calendar month (the common practice with
business customers) or some arbitrary sequence in which the accounts are arranged. The arbitrary cycle, which may be alphabetic
or numerical, normally provides for the processing of about onefifteenth or one-twentieth of the accounts each banking day, whereas
the calendar month cycle compresses the statement preparation
process into a few short days.
In the majority of banks even today, the bank statement will
probably be a product of what is knmvn as the "dual posting"
system.5 Under this system, two complete sets of books are kept for
each checking account-a ledger sheet and a statement sheet. The
ledgers and statements are divided into groups and, while one bookkeeper posts to the ledger accounts in one group and the statement
accounts in a second group, another bookkeeper posts to the ledger
3. LAPHAM, MODERNIZING THE ACCOUNTING SYsrEM OF THE MEDIUM SIZED BANK 16
(1954).
4. It has been estimated that the number of checking accounts rose from 27 million
to 47 million between 1939 and 1952; in this same period, the number of checks written
increased from approximately 3.5 billion to just under 8 billion checks per year. The
estimated figure for 1970 is 22 billion checks per year. Farnsworth, A General Survey of
Article 3 and an Example of Two Aspects of Codification, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 645, 652
n.63 (1966).
5. Al.DOM, PURDY, SCHNEIDER &: WHITTINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 23; LAPHAM,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 13-15. See also Clarke v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super. 304,
201 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1964).
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accounts in the second group and the statement accounts in the first
group. This system is best suited to the smaller banks where only
two bookkeepers are needed, for as the volume of accounts increases,
more pairs of bookkeepers are required and the attendant complexities are increased. In "dual posting" systems, the statements, like
the ledgers, are posted every day with each entry picking up the
previous balance, reflecting the paid or credited item, and extending
the new balance. The statement "run" must balance each day with
the ledger "run" and serves as a control on the entire posting
procedure. When either the end of the sheet or the appropriate day
in the thirty-day cycle is reached, the statement is pulled for mailing
to the customer. When a customer makes a special re<¥1est for a
statement out of cycle, it is a simple matter to pull the particular
statement and mail it.
Before the introduction of computers, some banks shifted to a
"single posting" method which, as its name suggests, consists of posting a single entry on a statement form, which is duplicated either by
carbon or photography before mailing.6 Machines were also developed for posting the statement and ledger sheet simultaneously,
thereby eliminating the necessity for photography or carbons. However, because this specialized equipment was substantially more expensive than the bookkeeping equipment previously used and since
additional safeguards and precautions were required to take the
place of the cross-check inherent in the dual posting method, many
banks elected to retain the traditional system.7
Today, an increasing number of banks either own or lease their
own computers or are using off-premises computer plans for their
demand deposit business. 8 Although the appearance of the statement
6. LAPHAM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 14-15.
7. Ibid. One such machine is the "Post-tronic," mentioned in Gibbs v. Gerberich, l
Ohio App. 2d 93, 98, 203 N.E.2d 851, 854 (1964).
8. Summaries of the findings of the 1966 American Banking Association's National
Automation Survey may be found in Banking, Sept. 1966, p. 35; id., Oct. 1966, p. 50; id.,
Jan. 1967, p. 97. The estimated 13,995 commercial banks were divided into four groups:
I. Those having their own computers or who are in the process of installation (943
or 7%);
II. Those using off-premises computer services (2,055 or 14%);
III. Those planning off-premises service or haviRg computers on order (1,358 or
10%); and
IV. Those having no computer processing and no computer on order (9,639 or
69%)The data indicate, not surprisingly, that the computerized banks tend to be those with
larger deposits: Banks in Group I had 67% of the nation's commercial deposits; Group
II, 10%; Group III, 5%; and Group IV only 18%. Among the banks in Group II using
off-premises computer services, about two-thirds have their servicing done by correspondents, the others use a "service bureau," a joint venture, or the computer facility
of a non-bank. It is estimated that by 1971 there will be over 7,600 commercial banks
using computers, or 55% of all commercial banks.
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reveals little change, the use of computers has produced several
changes in check-handling and statement preparation procedures.
For example, in a bank which services approximately 15,000 checking accounts, the accounts are divided into four roughly equal
groups, with a clerk assigned to each group. The checks are received by the clerk from the computer section (or off-premises computer facility) for visual examination and filing in the individual
account folders,9 having already been debited to the customer's account by the computer. Since the checks are received numerically
sequenced by account number through the computer's "reading" of
the magnetic figures embossed on the checks, filing has become more
efficient, typically permitting one clerk to handle 2000 to 3000 checks
per day. When the checks are filed, the clerk is supposed to verify
the signature on the check against the customer's signature card
which, to facilitate easy comparison, is normally placed at the top of
the folder itself. In some banks, the filing clerk will perform the
additional tasks of scanning the face of the check for obvious alterations, comparing the amount of the check as written with the magnetically encoded amount,10 examining the date of the check to see
whether the check is "stale,"11 and, in cases where the amount of the
check is over, say, $500, examining the indorsements to see that at
least the payee's signature is present.12 However, in many banks
which service a large volume of accounts, only the customer's signature is verified and, indeed, there is some indication that in large
city banks even this step is omitted.18 To return to our typical
computerized bank, on any given day each of the four clerks will
9. This would seem to "complete the process of posting" under § 4-109 although
the check has already been debited to the customer's account in the computer's "memory bank.'' Gibbs v. Gerberich, 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 97, 203 N.E,2d 851, 854 (1964); Penney, New York Revisits the Code: Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 62 COLUM, L. R.Ev. 992, 1003 (1962).
10. See Penney, supra note 9, at 1003 n.69; as to risk of loss for encoding errors, see
CLAilKE, BAILEY 8e YOUNG, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLI.EcrIONS 174-84 (1963).
11. See Au>oM, PURDY, SCHNEIDER 8e WH11TINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 24;
Penney, supra note 9, at 1003 n.69. The Code "stale check" rule is found in § 4-404,
discussed in CLARKE, BAILEY 8e YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 9, at 170.
12. See Al.DOM, PURDY, SCHNEIDER 8e WH11TINGHAM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 24; Penney, supra note 9, at 1003 n.69. As to the bank's liability for paying a check with a missing indorsement, see 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 2135-36 (1942). On the impact
of a bank's "negligence" in failing to notice a race track's indorsement on a check drawn
by a church, thus affecting the bank's rights under § 4-406 of the Code, see Jackson v.
First Nat'l Bank, 403 S.W.2d 109 (Tenn. App. 1966).
13. This is hearsay, but has been heard by the writer from several commercial bankers and their attorneys. See also Freed, Some Legal Implications of the Use of Computers
in the Banking Business, 81 BANKING L.J. 753, 761-62 (1964) (predicting eventual abandonment of the practice of signature verification). It is conceivable that equipment
could be devised to sort, store, and insert checks in mailing envelopes with the statement. Like the old advertisement, checks would be "never touched by human hands.''
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also receive approximately 200 statements from the computer center.
These statements may be for accounts in her group or, in banks
desirous of having more than one person visually examine each
check, for the accounts in one of the other groups. The accumulated
checks in the account file for a particular statement are removed and
counted to see that they correspond with the number of checks set
forth at the bottom of the statement. These checks are scanned to see
that the customer's signatures on the checks are all in the same handwriting. Moreover, the procedure may include matching individual
checks to the debit entries on the computer-prepared statement. The
computer-sorted checks, together with the computer-prepared statement, are then mailed to the customer in an envelope addressed by
the computer from information on tap in its "memory bank."
Whether the statements are prepared by the traditional double
entry or single entry method, or by computer, they follow a similar
form. There will be first a balance forward; then, by date and in
chronological order, a listing of checks paid, deposits credited, and
certain miscellaneous entries. After each entry, or group of entries,
the balance remaining in the account is shown in a column at the
right-hand margin. On computer-produced statements, the number
of checks paid and credits entered are also shown with their respective totals. 14 There is also an almost universal practice of printing
some sort of time period legend on the statement, such as: "Please
examine at once: If no error is reported within ten days of mailing
or delivery the account will be considered correct. All items are
credited subject to final payment"; or, more simply, "If no error is
reported within ten days the account will be considered correct."
On the reverse of the bank statement there will normally appear a
reconciliation form for the customer's use in comparing his records
of checks drawn and deposits made against the statement rendered
by the bank. Allowing for transactions subsequent to the date of the
statement, the reconciliation should, of course, result in the same
total as the total in the statement.

II.

COROLLARY DUTIES OF BANK: To PAY IN AccoRDANCE
WITH THE CuSTOMER's INSTRUCTION'S AND To
RENDER STATEMENTS OF AccoUNT

The elaborate procedures described above are pursued by the
banks in their effort to fulfill their common-law duty to provide their
customers with account information and to return the cancelled
14. Welch, The Paper Tape Path to Automation, Banking, Feb. 1966, pp. 111-12.
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checks and other papers covered by the statement.16 This duty arises
from the implied contract between the bank and its customer, but
neither the contract nor the common law has precisely defined the
scope of the duty: there is obviously some leeway as to when or how
often a statement of account must be rendered and the duty itself
is subject to modification by banking custom or course of dealing. 16
It is generally held, however, that the statement must at least be
accurate17 and in a form that enables the customer to verify the
account.
The bank's duties respecting the issuing of a statement of account
are a corollary to its obligation, also arising from the bank-customer
relationship, to pay funds out of the customer's account only in
accordance with the customer's instructions. 18 In the ordinary case,
therefore, the customer may demand recredit by an action in assumpsit if he discovers, upon examining his statement and cancelled
checks, that forged or altered checks have been deducted from his
account.19 However, breach of the customer's duties respecting the
account statement and cancelled checks may provide the bank with
a defense to such an action for recredit.
A. The Code Defense: Customer's Duty To Examine

the Statement and Checks
One of the most important defenses available to a customer's
action for recredit after the bank has paid a forged or altered check
is found in section 4-406 of the Code. 20 Codifying the common-law
15. See 5 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING 353, 374 (1936).
16. See U.C.C. § 1-205 as to course of dealing and usage of trade generally and
§§ 4-103(2) &: (3) as to the impact of "federal reserve regulations, clearing house rules,
operating letters, general banking usage and the like" upon the duties imposed by
Article Four.
17. Barclay Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 208 Cal. App. 2d 347,353, 25 Cal. Rptr.
383, 388 (1962).
18. See 10 A:f.r. JuR. 2D Banks § 494, at 462-63 (1963).
19. E.g., Johnson v. First Nat'! Bank, 367 Pa. 459, 465, 81 A.2d 95, 97 (1951); R. H.
Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'! Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 153, 48 A.2d 420, 426 (1946);
Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 108, 138 N.W.2d 157, 159 (1965).
20. Section 4--406. Customer's Duty to Discover and Report Unauthorized Signature
or Alteration.
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied by
items paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the statement and
items pursuant to a request or instructions of its customer or otherwise in a reasonable manner makes the statement and items available to the customer, the customer
must exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the statement and items
to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an item and must notify
the bank promptly after discovery thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to
comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the customer is
precluded from asserting against the bank
(a) his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the bank also
establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such failure; and
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rule, the Code requires the depositor to exercise "reasonable care and
promptness" in examining his statement and items.21 By showing
that the customer failed to comply with this duty and that the bank
has suffered a loss as a result, the bank is able to avoid liability on
an altered item or an item bearing the unauthorized signature of
the customer. The customer is further precluded from asserting any
unauthorized signature or alteration by the same ·wrongdoer on items
paid by the bank during a period measured from a "reasonable
period" (not exceeding fourteen days) after a statement which includes at least one such improperly paid item is "available" to the
customer, to the time when the customer notifies the bank of the
improper payment.22 Furthermore, the customer is barred from
asserting after one year any claim of alteration or forgery of his
signature by the section's "statute of limitations"23 and, although no
obligation is imposed upon the customer to discover forged (or "unauthorized") indorsements,24 he will be barred from asserting any
claim arising from such indorsements after three years. 25
(b) an unauthori:zed signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any
other item paid in good faith by the bank after the first item and statement was available to the customer for a reasonable period not exceeding fourteen calendar days and before the bank receives notification from
the customer of any such unauthori:zed signature or alteration.
(3) The preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer establishes lack of ordinary care on the part of the bank in paying the item(s).
(4) "Without regard to care or lack of care of either the customer or the bank
a customer who does not within one year from the time the statement and items
are made available to the customer (subsection (1)) discover and report his unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face or back of the item or does not
within three years from that time discover and report any unauthorized indorsement is precluded from asserting against the bank such unauthorized signature or
indorsement or such alteration.
(5) If under this section a payor bank has a valid defense against a claim of a
customer upon or resulting from payment of an item and waives or fails upon request to assert the defense the bank may not assert against any collecting bank or
other prior party presenting or transferring the item a claim based upon the unauthorized signature or alteration giving rise to the customer's claim.
21. Compare U.C.C. § 4-406(1), with Gritten v. Chemical Nat'! Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63
N.E. 969 (1902).
22. u.c.c. § 4-406(2); see BRADY, BANK CHECKS 566 (3d ed. 1962); Griffiths, Bank Deposits and Collections Before and After the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 Omo ST. L.J.
236, 244 (1962). As to the relationship of subsection (2) to the doctrine of "estoppel" as
applied to a series of forged checks under pre-Code law, see .BRITION, B1us AND NoTES
362-75 (1961); Spanogle, The Bank-Depositor Relationship-A Comparison of the Present Tennessee Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 VAND. L. R.Ev. 79, 88-90
(1962). It has been suggested that, under § 4-406(2)(b), the drawer would be penalized
for his failure to use due care even if the exercise of due care would not have prevented
the loss, as where the forger also alters the stubs to correspond with the cliecks. See note
56 infra.
23. u.c.c. § 4-406(4).
24. This confirms the common-law rule. See 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS
1877 (1942); 10 AM. JuR. 2D Banks § 51.!l, at 481 (1963).
25. U.C.C. § 4-406(4); see Murphey, Uniformity, Forged Indorsements, and Comprehension-Some Observations on the Uniform Commercial Code for Mississippi, 35 MI55.
L.J. 356, 361-77 (1964), for some difficult to comprehend observations and criticisms on
this point.
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It may be noted that, in addition to codifying the common-law
rule as to the customer's duty to examine and report, the Code
makes several changes in the previous widely-enacted American
Banking Association's Payment of Forged or Raised Check Statute: 26
(1) The Code applies to any "item," not merely checks; (2) any alteration is included, not merely "raising"; and (3) the Code applies
whenever the bank merely holds the customer's statement and items
pursuant to his request or otherwise makes them available to him.27
I. Measurement of Time Periods for Sending and Notifying

The time periods in section 4-406 run from "the time the statement and items are made available." 28 As the official comment points
out,29 "availability" can mean any one of three things. The bank
may "send" the statement and items to the customer, which includes
putting them in the mail properly addressed and stamped.30 Second,
the bank may hold the statement and items available for the customer pursuant to his request or instructions. Finally, the bank may
"otherwise or in a reasonable manner [make] the statement and
items available to the customer."31 Once the statement of account
and cancelled checks are made available to the customer, the customer has a duty to "notify the bank promptly after discovery" of
his unauthorized signature or any alteration.32 "Promptly" is not
defined in the Code, but presumably would be determined by the
finder of fact from "all the circumstances" as at common law.33 On
the other hand, notification is defined in the Code as "taking such
steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary
course whether or not such other actually comes to know of it"; 34
seemingly a duly mailed unambiguous note would satisfy this requirement.
26. 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1882-86 (1942); 2 id. Forged Paper § 9.1
(Supp. Dec. 1965).
27. See Penney, A Summary of Articles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New York, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 47, 90 (1962).
28. u.c.c. § 4-406(4).
29. U.C.C. § 4-406, comment 2.
30. U.C.C. § 1-201(38). For a case demonstrating a bank's attempt to show that it sent
a statement to its customer by proving its customary practice in this regard, see England
Nat'! :Bank v. United States, 282 Fed. 121 (8th Cir. 1922).
31. u.c.c. § 4-406(1).
32. u.c.c. § 4-406(1).
33. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
34. U.C.C. § 201(26). As to the sufficiency or content of the notice, see American :Bldg.
Maintenance Co. v. Federation :Bank 8e Trust Co., 213 F. Supp. 412, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. Am. v. Fulton Nat'l :Bank, 108 Ga. App. 356, 357, 133
S.E.2d 43, 44 (1963); Shattuck v. Guardian Trust Co., 204 N.Y. 200, 205, 97 N.E. 517,
519 (1912). See also U.C.C. § 1-201(27) as to "notice" to or "notification" of an organization.
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2. Scope of Customers Duty: Reconciliation
Since the way in which the customer discharges his duty to exercise reasonable care in examining his statement and items is not
spelled out in the Code, reference must be made to the common law.
It has been said that, as a minimum, the reconciliation procedure
should include the following steps: (I) a comparison of the cancelled
checks with the customer's check stubs; (2) a comparison of the
statement balance with the checkbook balance; and (3) a comparison
of the returned checks with the debits indicated on the statement.35
It should be noted once more that subsection (I) of section 4-406
deals solely with the discovery of forgeries and alterations. In some
cases, particularly those going beyond forgeries and alterations, courts
have indicated that the customer's duty in performing the reconciliation might include, for example, comparing returned checks with
daily journal entries (as well as with check stubs) or examining
duplicate deposit slips on which wrongful "less cash" deposits would
have been revealed.36
3. Effect of the Bank's "Contributory Negligence"
A bank which is itself guilty of negligence in failing to discover
a forgery, alteration, or discrepancy cannot avoid liability on the
ground that the customer was subsequently negligent in failing to
examine his statement or returned checks.37 Prior to the Code, the
common law required that once the payment of the forged or altered
check had been established, the bank had the burden of showing
that it exercised due diligence in the transaction before it could raise
35. See, e.g., Stumpp v. Bank of New York, 212 App. Div. 608, 614, 209 N.Y. Supp.
396, 402 (1925); Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, Ill, 138 N.W.2d
157, 160 (1965), citing Clarke v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super. 304, 201 A.2d 762, 766
(Super. Ct. 1964). See generally 10 AM. JUR. 2o Banks §§ 512, 569 & 604 (1963); BRADY,
BANK CHECKS 549 (3d ed. 1962); 5 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3403, at 375 (1936).
Compare Stumpp, supra, with Takenaka v. Banker's Trust Co., 132 Misc. 322, 229 N.Y.
Supp. 459 (New York City Ct. 1928). See also Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 449 (1953).
36. See, e.g., McKenzie & Mouk, Inc. v. Ouachita Nat'l .Bank, 159 So. 2d 304, 306
(La. Ct. App. 1964) (examination of "net deposits" would have revealed "less cash" withdrawals); First Nat'l Bank v. Fultz, 380 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). For cases in•
volving other measures or steps which customers should have taken to avoid being
characterized as negligent in the handling of their reconciliation and related duties, see
Basch v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 328-29, 139 P .2d 1, 8-9
(1943) (failure to investigate overdraft coupled with duty to examine); First Nat'! .Bank
v. Mann, 410 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1966) (investigation of continued overdrafts).
37. Leather Mfr's Nat'! Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); Gritten v. Chemical
Nat'! Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902); cases cited in 10 AM. JUR. 2o Banks § 519,
at 490-91 (1963). But see cases cited in Herbel v. Peoples State Bank, 170 Kan. 620, 628,
228 P.2d 929, 935-36 (1951); White Castle Sys. v. Huntington Nat'! Bank, 43 N.E.2d 737,
741-45 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).

1350

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:1341

the issue of the customer's negligence.38 If the bank was found to
have been negligent in the performance of its duty to pay only in
accordance with the customer's order, the customer could recover
notwithstanding a showing that he was negligent in the performance
of his duty toward the bank.39 The basis of the bank's liability is
its breach of its primary contractual obligation to the customer, not
its negligence.40 Section 4-406(3) changes this common-law rule to
the extent that the burden of proof with respect to the bank's negligence is placed upon the customer, rather than requiring the bank
to demonstrate its freedom from negligence. 41 However, if the customer cannot establish the bank's negligence, the bank must still
bear the burden of proof with respect to the customer's negligence.
4. Evidence of the Bank's Negligence
The two most common types of negligence which a customer is
likely to assert against a bank which has paid forged or altered
checks are that the bank's "system was wrong," or that the bank's
employees were negligent in the performance of their prescribed
duties. 42 In attempting to establish the first type of negligence, the
particular bank's "system" may be measured against what modem
banking practices are or what is the accepted banking practice in
the area, as evidenced by expert testimony.43 In those instances in
which only testimony of the procedures followed by the particular
bank is offered, the bank's system may be measured against the judi38. Johnson v. First Nat'! Bank, 367 Pa. 459, 463, 81 A.2d 95, 98 (1951); R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'! Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 153, 48 A.2d 420, 426 (1946);
Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 109, 138 N.W.2d 157, 159 (1965).
39. R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'! Bank, supra note 38.
40. See cases cited note 38 supra.
41. Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 110 n.6, 138 N.W.2d 157,
160 n.6 (1965). Absent the primary contractual obligation of the bank, this shifting of
the burden might be criticized as unduly favorable to banks. It is a difficult burden to
overcome since complete control and knowledge of the process at issue is in the hands
of defendant bank. Instructive materials in approaching this problem include: MORRIS,
TORTS 85 (1953); Roberts, An Introduction to the Study of Presumptions (pts. 1 &: 2),
4 VILL. L. REv. 1, 475 (1958-59); Comment, Allocation of Losses From Check Forgeries
Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE
L.J. 417 (1953). Is this an appropriate case for the invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur? If so, it would seem to contradict the statute's intent.
42. See Basch v. Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust&: Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 328, 139 P.2d
I, 9 (1943). This case also suggests a third possibility of claiming that the bank assigned
duties to employees who were not competent to operate the system set up by the bank.
For further references on evidentiary problems in this general context, see 5B MICHIE,
BANKS AND BANKING §§ 368d, 369e & h, 370f (1950).
43. E.g., Basch v. Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, supra note 42 at 330, 139
P.2d at 9 ("essentially the same as that followed in all San Francisco Banks, and is regarded as the accepted modern practice"); Clarke v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super.
304, 307-08, 201 A.2d 762, 764 (Super. Ct. 1964) ("in accord with the general usage and
practice in similar banks"), See also U.C.C. § 4-103, particularly subsections (2) and (3).
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cial conception of reasonableness. 44 Under either approach, examples
of relevant evidence are the instructions given to employees "relative
to detecting forgeries, or in handwriting," 45 the number of employees
performing a visual examination of the check or checks in question, 46
whether each check is compared to a signature card or simply to the
bookkeeper's "mental image" of the signature, 47 and how many
checks a single bookkeeper handles each day. 48 Moreover, in at least
one pre-Code case, the court concluded that where the burden was
on the bank to show its freedom from contributory negligence, it
had to show that, with respect to the particular checks in question,
its customary practices were carried out with due diligence; a mere
showing of its customary procedure in paying and examining checks
generally would not give rise to the inference that similar handling
was accorded these particular checks.49 In view of the enormous
flood of checks in most banks, such a holding would have created
tremendous difficulties for the banks had not the Code shifted to the
customer the burden of proving the bank's negligence.
The more likely avenue of attack by the customer would be to
focus on the negligence of a bank employee in paying a forged or
altered check which a competent teller or clerk ought to have noticed. Proof on this question normally requires putting the subject
checks into evidence together with the signature card. If the employee who examined the checks is forced to admit on the witness
stand that some of them ought not to have been paid, the lawsuit
is virtually won. 50 The bank may attempt to counter this attack
by calling a handwriting expert to testify that the checks are such
excellent forgeries that even an expert teller or bookkeeper could
not have detected them. 51 However, such testimony cannot be
44. E.g., Dank of Delaware v. Union Wholesale Co., 203 A.2d 109 (Del. 1964) (bank
did not prove its freedom from contributory negligence); First Nat'! Dank v. Mann, 410
P .2d 74 (Okla. 1966) (bank failed to absolve itself of negligence); R. H. Kimball, Inc. v.
Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'! Dank, 72 R.I. 144, 48 A.2d 420 (1946) (not clear on what
ground the bank lost); Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'! Dank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 138 N.W.2d
157 (1965) (bank found not negligent).
45. Dasch v. Dank of Am. Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 328, 139 P.2d I (1943).
46. Screenland Magazine v. National City Dank, 181 Misc. 454, 460, 42 N.Y.S.2d 286,
290 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (eleven persons); R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'!
Dank, 72 R.I. 144, 48 A.2d 420 {1946) (five persons).
47. Clarke v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super. 304, 201 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1964);
First Nat'! Dank v. Mann, 410 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1966); R. H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhole Island
Hosp. Nat'! Dank, supra note 46.
48. Clarke v. Camden Trust Co., supra note 47 (1000 checks per day).
49. Dank of Delaware v. Union Wholesale Co., 203 A.2d 109 (Del. 1964), dting R. H.
Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'! Dank, 72 R.I. 144, 48 A.2d 420 (1946). Compare Huber Glass Co. v. First Nat'! Dank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 138 N.W.2d 157 (1965).
50. See Dank of Delaware v. Union Wholesale Co., supra note 49; Basch v. Dank of
Am. Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 328, 139 P.2d I (1943).
51. See, e.g., Dasch v. Dank of Am. Nat'! Trust &: Sav. Ass'n, supra note 50 at 331,
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deemed expert, unless the witness is himself a banker or one qualified to testify as to what a knowledgeable, experienced, and careful
teller is able to discover under normal banking conditions.52 Of
course, if the witness also testifies that he would be unable to detect
the forgery on ordinary visual inspection but would have to resort
to microscopic or other scientific analysis, this would seem to be very
persuasive and relevant to the issue of the amount of care which
can reasonably be expected of bank employees. Nevertheless, the
final assessor of the bank's alleged negligence is the trier of fact, and,
when the checks and signature card are in evidence for the judge
or jury to see, it is probable that a visual examination of the documents themselves is as important as anything else in determining the
outcome. 53 However, as Justice Shientag remarked, the danger of
resolving this issue in the courtroom, far from the teller's cage, is
that bank tellers may be held to the standard of handwriting experts
and that it is considerably easier to spot a forgery among a collection
of checks bearing what purport to be the same signature than to
recognize one isolated forged check in a batch of checks drawn by
other customers.54
B. The Code's Contractual Defense: Printed Time
Limits for Customer Notification
Another argument often asserted by banks against customers
seeking readjustment of their accounts because the bank had accepted forged or altered checks is that the printed legend on the
bank statement, to the effect that any irregularities must be reported within a specified time, bars any claim after the lapse of
that time, the account having been deemed correct. The courts have
generally refused to give effect to such clauses, most frequently on
the basis that they had not been called to the customer's attention,
or, if they were, that the customer had not agreed to such provi139 P.2d at 10 ("excellent facsimiles'); Wuest Bros. v. Liberty Nat'l Bank 8: Trust Co.,
388 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Ky. 1965) ("could not be reasonably detected by the employees in
the normal course of banking business"); Clarke v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super.
304, 201 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1964) (ordinary person could not detect forgeries even by
comparison with signature card).
52. See Basch v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust 8: Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 328, 139 P.2d 1
(1943); R.H. Kimball, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Nat'l Bank, 72 R.I. 144, 48 A.2d 420
(1946).
53. See Screenland Magazine v. National City Bank, 181 Misc. 454, 42 N.Y.S.2d 286
(Sup. Ct. 1943) (trial judge comments on quality of forgeries); Huber Glass Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 29 Wis. 2d 106, 110, 138 N.W.2d 157, 160 (1965) (examination of documents
in evidence demonstrates that "each forged signature was a reasonable facsimile of the
genuine signature').
54. Screenland Magazine v. National City Bank, supra note 53, at 459, 42 N.Y.S.2d
at 290.
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sions. 155 The customer has also prevailed against such clauses when
they have been contained within ageements for the periodic mailing
of statements or within receipts for the delivery of statements and
cancelled checks.116
The Code does not deal squarely with the validity of such provisions other than by limiting the bank's ability to exculpate itself
for its own negligence in section 4-103, by imposing an overall
obligation of good faith in section 1-203, and by providing for variation by agreement and limitations on exculpation generally in section 1-102.57 As will be discussed below, the problem may also be
affected by section 1-204. Finally, section 1-103, making general principles of law applicable where not displaced by Code provisions, will,
of course, serve to make pre-Code law applicable to those aspects of
this problem not covered by the Code.
I. Time Periods on Bank Statements and Section 1-204

It may be argued that section l-204's statement that reasonable
time is determined by "the nature, purpose and circumstances" of
the particular case does not apply to fixing time periods under section 4-406 because the time periods are already fixed in section
4-406(4).158 However, the arbitrary cut-off periods in subsection (4)
should be distinguished from the duty imposed on the customer in
subsection (1 ). Subsection (1) was intended to carry fonvard and
codify the common-law rule requiring customers to examine their
statements and checks and report any forgeries, alterations, or discrepancies to the bank within a "reasonable time." 59 Subsection (1)
55. BRADY, BANK CHECKS 550-51 (3d ed. 1962); 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS
1875-77 (1942) and cases cited therein; 5 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3404, at 376
(1936, Supp. 1954). For a recent decision upholding such a provision, see Haman v. First
Nat'l Bank, 79 S.D. 565, 115 N.W.2d 883 (1962).
56. Frankini v. Bank of Am. Nat'! Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 86 P .2d 686 (Dist. Ct. App.),
afl'd on rehearing, 31 Cal. App. 2d 666, 88 P.2d 790 (1939); First Nat'! Bank v. American
Sur. Co., 71 Ga. App. 112, 31 S.E.2d 402 (1944).
57. See BRADY, BANK CHECKS 564-65 (3d ed. 1962).
58. U.C.C. § 1-204: Time; Reasonable Time; "Seasonably"(!) Whenever this Act requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time,
any time which is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.
(2) What is a reasonable time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose and circumstances of such action.
(3) An action is taken "seasonably" when it is taken at or within the time agreed
or if no time is agreed at or within a reasonable time.
See note 20 supra for text of U.C.C. § 4-406(4).
59. IO AM. JuR. 2D Banks §§ 511, 515 (1963); 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS
1880-82 (1942); see Basch v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d 316, 326,
139 P.2d I, 7 (1943) ("depositor had a legal duty ••• to examine within a reasonable
time" [emphasis by the court]). A distinction is to be made between the time for examining (or examining and reporting in the conjunctive) and the time for reporting
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as ·written requires the customer to exercise "reasonable care and
promptness" in examining the statement and further provides that
he must "promptly" notify the bank of discovered errors. Although
subsection (1) does not use the term "reasonable time," nonetheless
section l-204's statement would seem applicable. To the extent that
it is so applicable, it buttresses the authorities denying conclusive
effect to provisions included in bank statements.

2. The Effect of Section 4-103
An additional argument against giving effect to such clauses
might be advanced under section 4-103 on the ground that a provision for an unreasonably short period of time would serve in some
instances as a disclaimer of responsibility by the bank for its failure
to exercise ordinary care. One point which ought not to be overlooked, however, is that the last clause of subsection 4-103(1) 60 is, in
effect, an invitation to the commercial banking industry to devise
agreements to run between the banks and their customers; these
agreements can, for all practical purposes, determine the bank's
responsibility in handling the customer's checking account, including the processes of payment and statement preparation. Such an
agreement would have primary relevance to the bank's obligation
to exercise due care before asserting the "defense" of section 4-406
against a customer seeking recredit to his account, but such agreements could be tailored to fit the requirements of modem electronic
procedures.
C. Situations Not Covered by the Code

In spite of the expanded coverage of the Code, there are at least
n'lo types of customer claims arising from present statement proce-

dures which are not dealt with by the Code and which therefore
once the forgery, alteration or error has been discovered. As to the latter, the following
statement is instructive:
[T]here can be no arbitrary standard as to the length of time within which a
depositor, after discovering that his bank has charged a forged check to his account,
must give the bank notice thereof in order that he may not be precluded from setting up the forgery•••• The issue as to the timeliness of the notice is one of fact
to be so resolved according to the relevant and material attendant circumstances.
Johnson v. First Nat'! Bank, 367 Pa. 459, 464, 81 A.2d 95, 97 (1951).
60. U.C.C. § 4-103. Variation by Agreement; Measure of Damages; Certain Action
Constitutes Ordinary Care.
(1) the effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by agreement except
that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own lack of good
faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit the measure of damages for
such lack or failure; but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which such responsibility is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
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require the bank to rely on defenses grounded on the customer's
duty to examine that were also available under pre-Code law. The
first situation involves the "less cash" deposit made by the depositor's
faithless employee: when the deposit is made, the check(s) are totaled on the deposit slip, but are followed by a subtraction entry
reading "less cash" for a small amount, say fifty doIIars, which the
employee explains his employer needs for petty cash, but which he
himself pockets. In two cases61 involving this type of defalcation, the
bank has prevailed on the theory that it was the duty of the depositor
to examine his books and bank statements and to report any errors
to the bank with reasonable promptness; normal bookkeeping procedures would have revealed the ·wrongful deposits. The Code in
general, and section 4-406 in particular, is silent on this issue, as were
the previous statutes, but the courts have been able to decide the
cases on the strength of common-law principles, and Code section
I-103 would permit the same approach. However, while accepting
a deposit with a "less cash" entry may be permissible banking practice, 62 accepting a deposit of a single check accompanied by several
separate deposit tickets might appear sufficiently irregular and misleading so as to overcome the bank's defense of customer negligence
in failing to examine the statement. 63
Second, the Code does not deal with the obligation of a customer
to report a deposit made but not credited to his account. However,
common-law decisions, presumably still effective, have held that the
customer has a duty to perform accepted statement reconciliation
procedures if he wishes to hold an othenvise innocent bank for failure to credit a deposit. Indeed, in at least one case these procedures
were deemed to include use of the customer's books of account in
addition to his checkbook.il4
Many cases in these two areas involve a faithless employee who
not only commits the embezzlement but also has the responsibility
for reconciling the customer-employer's bank statements. Entrusting
this responsibility to an employee without appropriate safeguards
greatly simplifies, if not invites, embezzlement. The Code is silent
as to the effect of such delegation and, consequently, we must again
61. McKenzie & l\fouk, Inc. v. Ouachita Nat'l Bank, 159 So. 2d 304 (La. Ct. App.
1963), aff'd, 245 La. 732, 160 So. 2d 595 (1964); First Nat'! Bank v. Fultz, 380 s:W.2d 894
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
62. LAPHAM, l\foDERNIZING THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE MEDIUM SIZED BANK 4
(1954).
63. See Barclay Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 208 Cal. App. 2d 347, 356, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 383, 391 (1962); text accompanying note 17 supra.
64. Portsmouth Clay Prods Co. v. National Bank, 78 Ohio App. 271, 276-77, 69 N.E.2d
653, 655-66 (1946).
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assume that common-law rules apply. The majority and better reasoned view is that the customer-employer is charged only with notice
of what would have been disclosed had an honest employee reconciled the bank statement (and books).65 The minority view holds the
customer to whatever knowledge the embezzler himself had.66
Another type of situation not dealt with in the Code is one involving a discrepancy in favor of the customer. This might result
from the bank's failure to debit an item, its crediting to this customer's account of an item which should have been credited to
another account, or its making some other error (for instance, underencoding) which produces an overage on the customer's statement.
Where such an overpayment has been made, the bank's theory of
recovery will most likely be restitution-money paid by mistake.67
The bank's right to recover on these grounds, however, may be defeated if the customer can prove that he has innocently changed his
position to his detriment in reliance on the erroneous statement.68
Moreover, the law of "account stated," often used by banks in defending claims brought by customers, is equally applicable in this
instance as a defense to the bank's claim.69
Since these situations are not specifically covered in the Code, the
Code's time periods are not applicable. Indeed, the opportunity to
seek a readjustment of erroneous accounts appears to extend for a
considerable period of time70-as long as twenty years in special cir65. Clarke v. Camden Trust Co., 84 N.J. Super. 304, 201 A.2d 762 (Super. Ct. 1964);
Rainbow Inn, Inc. v. Clayton Nat'l Bank, 86 N.J. Super. 13, 205 A.2d 753 (Super. Ct.
1964); 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks§ 514, at 483-84 (1963); 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS
1878-80 (1942). This approach often prompts mention of the different outcome one
might expect between the case where the faithless employee alters only the name or
amount on the check and the case where he goes further and expertly alters the name
or amount on the checkbook stub as well. See Gritten v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 171 N.Y.
219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902).
66. Gritten v. Chemical Nat'! Bank, supra note 65.
67. See, e.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Diamond, 17 Misc. 2d 909, 186 N.Y.S.2d 917
(Sup. Ct. 1959).
68. 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS 1666-67 (1942) and cases cited therein.
69. Veneri v. Draper, 22 F.2d 33, 37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 633 (1927). See
also cases cited in 5 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3385 (1936).
The "account stated" rule typically provides that whenever a statement of account
is sent by a bank to one of its customers, together with his cancelled checks or vouchers,
and the customer does not object to it within a reasonable tinre, it becomes an account
stated between the bank and the customer. See F. A. Potts &: Co. v. Lafayette Nat'l Bank,
269 N.Y. 181, 199 N.E. 50 (1935); cases cited in 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS
1666-67 (1942). The statement is, however, not entirely conclusive even after it has been
retained and acquiesced in; it may still be impeached by either the bank or the cus•
tamer for fraud, mistake, or error. See Veneri v. Draper, supra at 37.
For interesting cases of customers claiming the benefit of entries in their favor improperly made in their passbooks, see British &: No. European Bank v. Zalzstein, [1927]
2 K.B. 92, 43 L.Q. REv. 305, 447 (1927); Commercial Bank of Scot. v. Rhind, 3 Macq.
643 (Scot. 1860), MEGRAH, PAGET's LAW OF BANKING 101 (7th ed. 1966).
70. 5 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3385, at 365 (1936).
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cumstances.71 Furthermore, a statute of limitations may be of no benefit to the bank, since in some states it does not begin to run until
demand for the uncredited amount is made. 72 Consequently, twentytwo states (as of 1965) 73 have been persuaded to adopt the Final Adjustment of Statements of Account Statute, which provides that the
account will be presumed correct after a specified period of time and
the customer (but not the bank) will thereafter be barred from
questioning the correctness of the account for any cause. The time
period varies, from state to state, from six months to seven years.
However, in those few states where the period is less than three years,
there may be a conflict with the Code's time limit for reporting
forged indorsements.74
Ill.

NEW BANKING SERVICES AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE
DUTIES To SEND AND EXAMINE STATEMENTS

There are a variety of new bank services that are now available
or contemplated for the near future which will affect the legal rights
of the parties arising from the return of statements of account and
cancelled checks.75 For example, many computerized banks are now
offering a "reconciliation service." This may consist of simply putting
the customer's checks in numerical sequence by pre-printed check
serial numbers so as to facilitate comparison with the checkbook.
Other banks may, in addition, print the statement in a form that includes serial numbers of paid checks together with some means of
calling attention to those checks within the sequence which have not
yet been debited (as by printing asterisks where the missing checks
would appear). Still other banks provide an actual reconciliation of
the account, relying on a duplicate checkbook furnished by the customer. Since the statement and items are returned to the customer
under the first two variations, he would still be subject to the same
duties respecting examination as under the traditional method of
reconciliation. Of course, if the bank should err in its preparation
71. Goodell v. Brandon Nat'! Bank, 63 Vt. 303, 305-06, 21 At!. 956, 957 (1891).
72. See, e.g., Goodell v. Brandon Nat'! Bank, supra note 71. But see 5 ZOLLMAN,
BANKS AND BANKING § 3388, at 372 (1936),
73. 2 PATON'S DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS, Deposits § 8.5 (Supp. 1965).
74. The suggestion of an apparent conflict is made in Owen, Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collections, 38 U. CoLo. L. R.Ev. 65, 94 (1965). But see Major Oil Dev. Co.
v. First Nat'! Bank, 75 N.M. 179, 182-83, 402 P.2d 160, 162 (1965) (suggestion that Final
Adjustment of Statement of Account statutes are not generally applicable to cases of
forgery or alteration but only to "the mathematical correctness of the statement of account''); BRADY, BANK CHECKS 561 (3d ed. 1962); id. § 15:30, at 125 (Supp. 1967).
75. For a discussion of computerized banking services other than those mentioned
in the text, see Dean, The New Look in Banking Services, Business Automation, Jan.
1965, p. 36.
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of the statement in a way which tends to conceal a discrepancy (for
example, by omitting an asterisk), this would undoubtedly be seized
upon by the customer as the basis for claiming that the bank's defense of negligent examination is unavailable to it. Under the third
variation, where the reconciliation is actually performed by the bank,
the ability to assert the customer's negligence becomes even more
remote, particularly when the cancelled checks are not returned to
the customer.
Another variation, under which the bank keeps the cancelled
checks and submits only a periodic statement to the customer listing
the paid checks in serial sequence with attention drawn to missing
items, is already in operation on a significant scale.76 This plan was
tested by Bankers Trust Company in New York City with 120 employee accounts over a three-year period; 77 many payroll accounts
have been handled in this way by computerized banks for some time.
If the customer does not receive the checks paid by the bank, it does
not seem reasonable to hold him accountable for failure to examine
for forgeries and alterations. But is he nevertheless to be held liable
under section 4-406(1) because his duty begins when the statement
and (or?) items are "made available" (held pursuant to instructions)
to him? 78 There are at least two problems here: first, whether "statement and items" can be read in the disjunctive so that the rule would
apply even though only a statement is returned to the customer; and
second, whether the bank can start the rule operating in its favor by
accompanying the statement with a legend thereon to the effect: "We
will hold the checks for you for your examination for 'X' days. " 79 It
seems to this ·writer that a customer (particularly a large one) entering
such an arrangement would be well advised to have his attorney work
76. As the customer of Barclay's Bank of Khartoum for eight months in 1965-1966,
this writer can testify to the convenience of such a system. See MEGRAH, PAGET's LAw
OF BANKING 119-20 (7th ed. 1966), for a discussion of the practice of returning a customer's paid checks in England. This same book contains an interesting and informative discussion of both the English and American law relating to passbooks, statements
and cancelled checks. See id. at 99-120.
Apparently, banks in some South and Central American countries put the same onus
of care in safeguarding personalized and serialized checks upon the customer which this
writer experienced in Khartoum. See Murray, Forged Bills of Exchange and Checlis: A
Comparison of the Anglo-American, European and Latin American Law, 82 BANKING
L.J. 565, 581 (1965). The computerization of the payment process and reduction or elimination of signature verification in this country has prompted a similar suggestion.
Freed, Some Legal Implications of the Use of Computers in the Banking Business, 81
BANKING L.J. 753, 761-62 (1964).
77. Livingston, Why Return the Checks?, The Bankers Magazine, Summer 1966,
p. 15.
78. U.C.C. §§ 4-406(1) & (4); see note 20 supra for text of this section.
79. And neglecting to specify that "after which, if there are any forgeries, alterations, etc., the loss will be borne by you."
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out a specific agreement as to what the responsibilities of the parties
are and who is to bear the loss with respect to such occurrences as
forgery and alteration.so In any event, the advent of such practices
calls for a re-examination of the scope of the customer's duty under
section 4-406.
Another emerging banking service is the practice of "one check
payrolls" by which, after debiting the customer's account, either
direct credits are made to his employees' personal accounts in the
same bank or in some other bank participating in the schemes1 or,
alternatively, "cashier's checks" or "treasurer's checks" are prepared
by the bank in reliance on a list or order submitted by the customer.s2
It is apparent that under this scheme there will be no obligation
upon the customer to examine cancelled checks nor is there a bank
statement, in the traditional sense, to be reconciled. The same observation may be made with respect to consumer or non-business account arrangements for bill paying.sa Services are available or being
discussed that would pay automatically certain basic recurring bills
such as mortgage payments, utilities, insurance premiums and the
like without being instructed each time by the customer: these payments are also accomplished by either internal entries or the preparation of cashier's checks by the bank. An elaboration of this scheme
contemplates the customer's submitting even his non-recurring or
more flexible bills to his bank for payment in monthly "batches,"
thus shifting to the bank virtually all of the customer's check-writing
and reconciliation chores. Again, the transfer of function eliminates
most of the customer's legal liability as well.
Just about the ultimate among the so-called "checkless society"
schemes is the "System for Automatic Value Exchange" or "SAVE"
for short.s 4 Under this scheme, the customer carries little cash and
no checks; he carries only a card which is used by retailers to activate
a series of computers which are able to accomplish a transfer from the
buyer's "bank acount" to the retailer's "bank account" and, in some
instances, a loan to the customer to finance the purchase. The cus80. Such an agreement is permitted by U.C.C. § 4-103(1), set out in note 60 supra.
81. See Bank of Utah v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 369 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1966).
82. Suppose the payroll clerk in the customer's office pads the payroll list with the
names of a few fictitious employees. Is the faithless clerk an "agent or employee of the
maker or drawer" within the meaning of§ 3-405(1)(c)?
83. See Duffy, Some of the Pitfalls in EDP, Banking, Aug. 1966, p. 47.
84. See Sprague, System for Automatic Value Exchange, Banking, June 1966, p. 117.
See also Salveson, A New Medium of Exchange, Banking, Dec. 1966, p. 99 (describing the operation of the Universal Bank Credit Card System); Dean &: Mathews, The
Electronic Dollar, Business Automation, Nov. 1966, p. 35; Sprague, Electronic Business
Systems-Nineteen Eighty-Four, Business Automation, Feb. 1966, pp. 39, 45-46.
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tomer will receive periodic statements of his account, but they will
be only vaguely similar to those received at present, and, of course,
there will be no checks as such returned to him. The present provisions of Article Four, including section 4-406, would again seem to
be inadequate to deal with such a scheme, and a new statute or set
of provisions for inclusion in the Code may well have to be devised.85
The time consumed in the reconciliation process and the space
required for check storage, especially with respect to large commercial customers, argue strongly for the adoption of such procedures as
those mentioned above as a convenience to the customer. By the same
token, the press of the increasing volume of work in modern banks
militates toward the abandonment of careful, or in some instances of
any, signature verification or other examination procedures. To the
extent that checks drawn by customers will still be utilized in the
future, the relational obligation of a bank to its customer will continue to permit assumpsit recovery for payment of forged or altered
checks, but the possibilities of asserting the negligence of the customer have already been, and will be further, affected by changing
banking practices. In an attempt to keep pace with the times, it seems
likely that banks will draft provisions, to be incorporated in agreements with both traditional or special checking account customers,
delineating standards by which their responsibility for the exercise
of ordinary care is to be measured.86 Such standards must not be
"manifestly unreasonable," but it seems likely that reasonableness
would have to be determined in the context of modern banking
"facts of life," including the ever-escalating volume of work, trained
personnel shortages, and the nature of electronic and other equipment. I think most of us will live to see the day, however, when private agreements will no longer suffice and an entirely new statute
will have to be drafted.
85. For a discussion of some of the new schemes contemplated and a draft of some
provisions to be added to Article Four, see Dunne, Variation on a Theme by Parkinson
or Some Proposals for the Uniform Commercial Code and the Checkless Society, 75
YALE L.J. 788 (1966).
86. U.C.C. § 4-103(1). The text of this subsection is set forth in note 60 supra.

